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In Search of a Political Ethics of Intersubjectivity: 
Between Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas and the 
Judaic
Anna Topolski
My dissertation explores the possibility of an approach to the political that is rooted in 
intersubjectivity and by this means creates a space for an ethics that arises from within 
the polis. It arose in response to the contemporary lack of interest (and general disdain) 
in the political among citizens in developed nations, especially among those of my 
generation as well as in response to the post-Shoah call Never Again. These concerns led 
me to seek an approach to the political that was inspirational, that could motivate 
individuals to participate, as well as one that approached the ‘other’ in positive rather 
than negative terms. The first, as I hope to make clear in part one, is certainly to be found 
in the thought of Hannah Arendt and the second in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. 
After considering both authors, I was struck by several resonances (and many 
discordances) in their different projects. It is these resonances that also pointed the way 
towards the Judaic. It is this goal that led me to ask whether an intersubjective approach 
to the political may help to revitalise this realm of human interaction. Intersubjectivity, it 
seemed to me, is the bridge between Arendt’s notion of the political as rooted in plurality 
and Levinas’ ethics of alterity, a bridge that may also be a response to the hope that 
humanity will never again experience its inhumanity. My hypothesis is that because of the 
tendency, partially determined by history, to view the political in terms of singularity, are 
flection on what is in fact central to the political – the relations between people – has 
been overlooked.
***
Before turning to their thought, I would like to begin by presenting snippets of their life 
stories, exemplary of many Jewish intellectuals in the twentieth century. Born in 1906 in 
central Europe,both studied, for different periods of time, in Germany. More particularly 
both studied in Heidelberg with Heidegger whose words and deeds forever left its mark. 
Arendt and Levinas did in fact share the same classroom in the 20’s and yet it was for 
different courses. Confronted by the rising antisemitism, both Arendt and Levinas were 
forced to dramatically re-orient the course of their lives. interestingly while both sought 
refuge in Paris in the 30’s, travelling in the same philosophical, cultural and Jewish 
circles, there is no sign that they met. Soon after the war broke out in Europe, Levinas 
found himself in a POW camp at the same time as Arendt was being held in an 
internment camp. Against all odds, both survived the war – which is more than one can 
say for most of their friends and families. After the war Levinas returned to France while 
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Arendt became an American citizen. Both quickly returned to the only means they had to 
make sense of what had happened – by thinking and writing. In addition, it was after the 
war that both re-dedicated themselves with vigour to Judaism, although in very different 
ways. While it seems that their paths diverged from this point on, Arendt defining herself 
as a political thinker and Levinas as an ethical thinker, there were those –such as Jean 
Wahl, who saw the resonance in their thought as early as 1947 and chose to include both 
their writings in his journal. Thus while their ideas crossed paths in the 40’s, it was not 
until a quarter-century later that they themselves met. By this time both had found fame, 
of sorts. Levinas had finally been welcomed into the French academic circles and had 
even become a sort of ethical celebrity while Arendt, no stranger to controversy, had 
become a household name in America, albeit not always an appreciated one. For this 
reason, in 1970, the Jesuit University of Loyola chose to honour both of these Jewish 
thinkers with doctorates and it was thus on stage, in Chicago, that they met … and from 
all accounts neither was too impressed.
While they were not impressed with each other, I have been profoundly impressed by 
both their lives and writings. It is for this reason that I chose to engage them in an 
intellectual dialogue. Given their shared personal, philosophical, and historical back-
grounds, one would have thought that a close analysis of the resonances in their 
respective projects had already been undertaken. To add to this dialogue between Arendt 
and Levinas, I have also decided to question the predominant reading of Arendt as both a 
Greek and unethical thinker. In addition, again in relation to Jewish thought, I thought it 
important to challenge the predominant mode of reading Levinas’ so-called confessional 
writings and his so-called philosophical writings separately. Aware of the difficulty of 
engaging Jewish thought in philosophical terms, and more specifically political terms, I 
hope to have shown that such an approach to Levinas is a fruitful one. 
Yet, and let me be clear, my goal in this dialogue is not reconcile or compare their 
thought; this would be both an impossible and uninteresting endeavour. Rather, my goal 
is to explore the possibility of an approach to the political that is rooted in intersubjecti-
vity and by this means to create a space for an ethics to arise from within the polis. For 
this I rely on the innovative and intriguing notions of the political, ethics and inter-
subjectivity put forward by Arendt, Levinas and the Judaic respectively. 
By defining the political in Arendtian terms, I begin with a space of inter-action defined 
by plurality. Yet, as Arendt’s notion of the political lacks a ‘methodical’ reflection on the 
‘principles’ of action, I turn to Levinas to shed some light on this lacuna by means of his 
ethics of alterity. To further develop this connection between alterity and plurality, I 
develop the notion of relationality, inspired by the Judaic, connecting it to a 
phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity. 
I take intersubjectivity to be a political principle rooted in hope and an appreciation for 
the enriching effects of alterity, of the stranger rather than the friend or neighbour. 
Intersubjectivity thus does not presuppose that one appreciates others because of their 
similarities to the self but that one comes to understand that difference and responsibility 
is elevating and humanising. Concretely what this entails is an understanding of the 
interconnectedness of every human being. Lastly, intersubjectivity is a means to remind 
us that even without roots one remains rooted in the world by being connected to others. 
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My hypothesis is that because of the tendency to view the political in terms of 
singularity, a perspective greatly determined by the priority of ontology in Western 
thought, a reflection on what is in fact central to the political – the relations between 
people – has been overlooked. 
Methodologically, my thesis combines three approaches. 
First, in each part, I dedicate myself to a close textual readings of my three sources in 
order to put forward my interpretations of their thought and to bring to light what I take 
to be the import of their work for my project. 
Second, I argue for the need for a novel principle for the political – one that embraces 
plurality and alterity by means of intersubjectivity. Rather than take the route of a 
normative approach to the political, I have chosen to develop and deepen Arendt’s notion 
of the plurality of the political by means of Levinas’ ethics of alterity. While I by no means 
which to conflate ethics and politics, as the gap between them is fundamentally necessary, 
I do believe that both need to be challenged and a dialogue re-opened between these 
distinct realms. While there is clearly a danger, in contemporary liberalism, of treating 
politics as the means to apply to certain ethical principles, it is my claim that a greater 
danger for modern society, one exposed by totalitarianism, is of a complete divorce 
between the political and the people and that a political landscape devoid of all ethics can 
lead to both self and world alienation.
Thirdly, in the conclusion, I go beyond Arendt, Levinas and the Judaic taking what I see 
to be best from each in order to lay the post-foundational ‘foundation’ for my own project 
– a political ethics of intersubjectivity. 
Now, I’d like to explore each of these three parts more closely.
In part 1, I begin by presenting what I take to be central, and valuable, to Arendt’s 
conception of the political developed in response to her original analysis of totalitari-
anism. By deconstructing the Nazis’ ‘method’, Arendt identifies the horizontal and vertical 
aspects of the human realm that were systematically eliminated and highlights the 
importance of four distinct, yet intertwined, realms: the legal, political, ethical and 
personal. Her choice to focus on the political arises from the fact that it is the political 
realm that is, for her, the realm in which humanity can recover its inhumanity. For 
Arendt, the political is a horizontal space of intersubjective inter-action and is thus much 
more fragile than the legal, for example, which has a vertical dimension. 
I then focus on Arendt’s concept of action, in its relation to freedom and power, which I 
argue are the basis for her understanding of plurality, interpreted as the between which 
arises from agonistic dialogue. What I am most intrigued by in her interpretation of the 
political is this notion of intersubjectivity, as the basis for the creation of a shared reality, 
a creation that requires a plurality of distinct persons and perspectives. I then narrow my 
reading of Arendt to the relationship between the political and morality by focusing on 
her writings dealing with judgement and responsibility, both of which also arise from an 
intersubjective dialogue based on dissensus. Here I argue that dissensus –rooted in the 
alterity of the other, as opposed to consensus, must underline our understanding of the 
political. Specifically in the case of Arendt, conflict has the ability to disclose a shared 
world to those in dialogue yet I do not think this is a sufficient for a political realm 
characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity. 
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Next, as part of the untold Arendtian story is of the importance of the Judaic in her 
thought. While she was certainly not a practicing Jew, her life and writings are dedicated 
to Jewish themes. In addition she worked for Jewish organisations for over 25 years. 
What I take to be a fundamental argument for exploring the Judaic in her thought is the 
importance of her call for Jews to recognise the importance of the public and political 
realm and, in addition, her appreciation for the need to be seen in this realm by those, like 
the Jews, who have historically been excluded and often persecuted.It is this fundamental 
connection between the experience of the Jewish people during the Shoah, which 
philosophical can be expressed by means of the Judaic, and the importance of the notion 
of humanity for the polis that I seek to bring out. 
I conclude part 1 by bringing to light the ethical cleft in Arendt’s thought and its 
potential dangers. Simply put, I use Levinas’ ethics as a means to critique Arendt. While I 
argue that ethics and the political must be respected as two distinct domains, each with 
their own ‘rules’, I do believe that it is important for a realm of praxis to embrace certain 
values regarding the interactions between individuals, power-relations and responsibility. 
It is in search of such praxis oriented principles that I turn to the thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas in part 2. It is also important here to make clear that for Levinas ethics is first and 
foremost horizontal, there is transcendence in the face-to-face relation. Ethics, as 
opposed to morality, is thus understood not as another competing conception of the Good 
but rather a means to discover the goodness that exists in humanity through our relations 
to the other, relations based, as Levinas argues, on responsibility. Although I respect 
Levinas’, and many of his readers, choice to maintain a distinction between his so-called 
philosophical writings and his so-called confessional writings, part of the novelty of my 
project is that I show how these enrich each other and ought not to be read separately 
even though this raises many problems, which my project cannot avoid, about the role of 
religion in the political and the role of the Judaic in philosophy. 
I first consider Levinas’ unique approach to ethics that embraces what Arendt sees as 
central to the political, its condition of plurality, a plurality based in alterity and its 
prioritization of the intersubjective relationship that is not defined by the same (that is 
consensus). What Levinas offers is a penetrating analysis of the intersubjective 
relationship, in ethical terms, which could possibly ‘ground’ Arendt’s political notion of 
plurality and enrich the ethical potential of the polis. Given the complexity of Levinas’ 
thought, I dedicate two chapters to a consideration of his critique of Heidegger, to his 
notion of ethics as first philosophy and the development of his ethics of alterity in relation 
to the notions of responsibility and justice. 
Having considered the ‘theoretical’ framework with which Levinas is working, I turn to 
his writings on the political focusing on his writings on Israel, human rights, and the 
state. One of the claims I put forward in this chapter is that Levinas’ notion of justice, 
inspired by his ethics, shares several critical Arendtian resonances. One noteworthy 
example is that of human rights. Both Arendt and Levinas recognise the importance of 
human rights but criticise their foundation in an abstract quality and both promote the 
importance of responsibility in dialogue with rights. Lastly, I challenge Levinas’ account 
of the politics which is too closely linked to his ethics. It thus fails to maintain a proper 
appreciation of the distinction between the sphere of the political and the ethical. In this 
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sense, I now use Arendt to critique Levinas. I also address a rather difficult question 
regarding the type of response that was needed to totalitarianism. While Levinas sees this 
as being ethical, in line with the Judaic, Arendt – a maverick in this manner – understood 
and argued for the need for the Jews to discover the public realm and to act in it. In other 
words, while his phenomenology of the face-to-face justifies the commandment thou shall 
not kill, in its ethical form it cannot appear in the political realm - the realm from which 
totalitarianism arose. By reducing the Shoah to its ethical failure, Levinas – along with 
many other Jews of his generation – fails to appreciate the importance of the polis for 
precisely for people such as the Jews who have throughout history been excluded from it. 
It is however worth noting that it is also because of this exclusion that the Judaic can 
confront the Western political tradition.
Part 3 is dedicated to the Judaic. In short, I define the Judaic by differentiating it from 
Judaism, the religion, and from being Jewish, as an ‘identity’. The Judaic is thus 
restricted to the ‘philosophical’ tradition within Judaism. I further limit my use of this 
term to the period of modernity when Jews were confronted, for the first time, with the 
meaning of the choice to believe in the ideals and principles of the Judaic. It is also 
because of my definition of the term Judaic that I differentiate the Judaic from either a 
Judeo-Christian approach or a Christian approach. While the former seeks to reconcile 
the differences between these philosophical and religious traditions, my emphasis is on 
those differences that may be fruitful for a dialogue with Western politics that has 
certainly had a closer association with Christianity than with Judaism. 
It is for this reason that in my final chapter, I follow a different approach by exploring 
four elements central to the Judaic that I argue are of political importance for a political 
ethics of intersubjectivity. These are: hope, relationality, responsibility and education. A 
central aspect of this claim is on the level of a Judaic philosophical anthropology which is 
grounded in hope and a notion of transcendence that is horizontal rather than vertical. 
With hope, rather than fear which I suggest has been a dominant voice in the political 
since Hobbes and certainly in the aftermath of totalitarianism, I argue that it is possible to 
conceive of the political as a space for creation and interaction rather than security and 
protection. It is my claim that the other, while a stranger, need not be interpreted asa 
threat to the self. In brief, I suggest that hope, may be an appropriate principle with which 
to inspire the political. Secondly, I develop the importance of relationality, which has ties 
to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, as the ‘foundation’ for the political rather than 
singularity. Thirdly, I consider the importance of prioritising a discourse of responsibility, 
in addition to that of rights, if either are to have any real political import. Lastly, I develop 
the central role education has played in creating a virtual Jewish public space.
In the conclusion, I return to consider what can be learned from an intersubjective 
approach to political ethics. While this does not, to be sure, amount to a comprehensive or 
normative political doctrine, I hope that it offers a contribution to the political in the form 
of a distinctive mode or orientation with regard to both thought and action, a contribution 
that can: 1) create a critical distance from which to consider the political, 2) challenge the 
assumption that our understanding of the political must arise from either the individual, 
the citizen, or the group, and 3) point towards a new perspective on the political in light of 
an intersubjective understanding of the human condition with regard to our responsibility 
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for others and the shared world. Each of these parts is necessary to ‘found’ and 
‘substantiate’ my claim that the political needs to be rethought from the perspective of 
intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity that is an ethical principle appropriate to the realm 
of the political.
Dr. Anna Topolski
Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
Parkstraat 45 # 3602, 4.273000 Leuven Tel: 32 (0)16 323262
E-mail: anya.topolski@hiw.kuleuven.be
6 
